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Case No. 20070325CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Jack Wilkinson,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. This Court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the information provided by a reliable confidential informant and
corroborated by Officer Beebe's observations establish reasonable suspicion to stop
the vehicle in which defendant was riding for further investigation of drug
distribution?
2. Was the frisk of defendant justified by the totality of the circumstances,
including the lateness of the hour, the number of people in the vehicle, the CFs tip

that drugs were being transported for distribution, the furtive movements of the
backseat passengers, the observed signs of drug impairment in both the driver and
defendant, and the officer's knowledge that drug dealers are often armed?
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress.
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 1 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application
of the legal standards to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, I f 11-12,103 P.3d 699.
CONSTTIUTTONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a controlled
substance (metiiamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, and
possession of pciraphemalia, a class A misdemeanor. R.4-3. Prior to trial, he filed a
motion to suppress. R. 44. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary
2

hearing. R. 176:33-69. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 160-59. The court
sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the felony
charge and zero-to-one year on the misdemeanor charge. The court ordered the
sentences to n m concurrent with each other and with the sentence defendant was
serving at the time. The court also imposed a $50 fine, and ordered that defendant
complete his current drug program at the prison and get involved in a community
support program upon release. R. 166-64. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
R. 171-68.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
By May of 2006, Troy Beebe, a certified drug recognition expert and officer of
the Provo City Police Department, had been working with the Utah County Major
Crimes Task Force for almost three years. R. 176:40,88,94,95. In that capacity, he
had worked with a particular confidential informant ("CI") on numerous occasions.
Id. at 34-35. The CI had proved consistently reliable, providing accurate information
about drug distribution, participating in controlled buys for the police, and helping
Officer Beebe make multiple arrests. Id. at 35-36.

1

The facts are recited "in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling
denying [a] motion to suppress." State v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170,f2,163 P.3d
687.
3

On May 24 th, the CI called Officer Beebe to say that Mary Albert was in Salt
Lake City, picking up methamphetamine to distribute in Utah County. Id. at 11,36.
The CI also reported that defendant was traveling with Albert. Id. at 39,51. The
officer instructed the CI "to call [Albert] back and ask her if she would sell him a
teener of meth." Id. at 36. The CI did so. Albert agreed to the arrangement and told
the CI "that she would meet him at her residence in Provo." Id.
Officer Be€*be and two other detectives set up surveillance in their unmarked
minivan close to Albert's home. Id. at 37,47. Beebe testified at trial: "Well, in the
investigation of this distribution of controlled substance we had set up a
surveillance for a specific vehicle. This vehicle was Mary Albert's vehicle, and we're
specifically looking for Mary Albert and Jack Wilkinson, and was also - those are
the two names that I was familiar with and had previous experience." Id. at 89.
Once surveillance was established, the CI called Mary Albert again, asking
her where she was. She responded that she was on her way but had to stop to pick
up a friend. Id. at 37. Later, the CI called once more, asking Albert where she was
and telling her "he had people waiting for the meth, and that he needed her to
hurry." Id. Albert "indicated that she was on her way, she was by R.C Willey in
Orem taking the back roads and would be there shortly." Id.

4

Five to ten minutes later, around 3 a.m., Officer Beebe saw Albert's Jeep
Cherokee, with which he was "very familiar," approach on a route and after a time
interval consistent with the back roads between R.C. Willey and Albert's home. Id.
at 38, 90. As the Jeep drove past, Beebe recognized both Albert, in the front
passenger seat, and defendant, in the rear seat behind the driver, by sight. Id. at 39,
90. A total of five people were in the vehicle. Id. at 80. Beebe pulled out and
followed the Jeep. He turned on his red and blue lights and then "chirp [ed]" his
siren. Id. at 100-01. The Jeep traveled about 400 feet, "an unreasonable length of
time" according to Beebe, before finally pulling over. Id. at 41; accord id. at 90-91.
Before the Jeep stopped, Officer Beebe observed Mary Albert sliding down in her
seat and then coming back up and the people in the back seat "reaching back behind
the seat into the very back compartment." Id. at 54; accord id. at 39,91. Officer Beebe
articulated that he stopped the Jeep to continue his investigation into the
distribution of controlled substances. Id. at 42,90.
Approaching the driver, Officer Beebe had two concerns. He testified,
"Individuals in the drug culture often arm themselves to protect themselves both
from the criminal element and from law enforcement, and the discard of evidence,
to hide, secrete [sic], damage, destroy evidence." Id. at 41. Beebe first approached
the driver, Mary Albert's son, and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Id. at 42,93.
5

Beebe immediately observed that he had bloodshot eyes and was speaking very
loudly, which the officer testified were both indicators of methamphetamine use. Id.
at 42. As the driver got out of the Jeep, Beebe noticed a syringe cap on the car floor,
"by the driver's side where the lever would be to release the seat back/forward."
Id. at 42,43. Beebe testified that his training and experience led him to believe this
was drug paraphernalia used for the ingestion of methamphetamine. Id. at 43-44.
He testified, "After observing the syringe cap, I advised everyone to put their hands
where I could see t h e m . . . [to] fr[ee]ze the environment/' Id. at 44.
Once the driver was out of the car, frisked, and sent over to the other
detectives, Officer Beebe turned his attention to the driver's side back seat
passenger, defendant. Beebe opened the car door and asked defendant to step out.
Id. at 44,93. Officer Beebe testified, "As I spoke with him I noticed that his skin tone
was flush, that he also had red, bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils." Id. at 93; accord
id. at 52,102. The officer frisked defendant. Feeling "several items" in defendant's
pockets, Beebe initially asked defendant to empty them. Id. at 44. When defendant
reached in, however, the officer asked him to stop, realizing that he would be at risk
if defendant had a weapon. Id. at 50. The officer then completed the search,
discovering in defendant's pocket a dollar bill folded into a bindle, containing a

6

white crystalline substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine. 2 Id. at
44,95,102-03- He also found bolts, screws, a pocket knife, and other unspecified
miscellany- Id. at 56-57. Officer Beebe arrested defendant for the unlawful
possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion because the
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which defendant was riding
and because the frisk was justified under the totality of the circumstances.
Defendant contests the frisk but not the search of his person. While his
brief contains some language referencing the search, his specific argument is not
readily discernible. See Appellant Br. at 16-17. Under such circumstances, this
Court should decline to consider his claim. Briefing requirements are articulated in
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and require not only that the appealing
party cite pertinent authority but also that the party develop that supporting
authority through reasoned analysis. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). A party must
carefully analyze and apply the cited authority to the facts of the case in order to
convince the reviewing court that a specific and harmful mistake has been made.
An issue is inadequately briefed '"when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking
as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/" State v.
Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113,72 P.3d 138 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,
18,995 P.2d 14). When this occurs, as here, the reviewing court should decline to
consider the issue on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,113,974 P.2d 269
(when a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis of a claim, reviewing court
declines to consider the merits).
Defendant's only cogent argument related to the search is that the
unlawfulness of the frisk rendered evidence found in the subsequent search
inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Appellant Br. at 11,20. Where the
frisk was lawful, however, there is no such fruit.
7

Specifically, information provided by a reliable confidential informant and
corroborated by Officer Beebe created reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for
further investigation of drug distribution. Once the vehicle was properly stopped
and the driver was asked out of the car, the totality of the circumstances justified the
frisk of defendant. The officer, outnumbered even with his backup, was faced with
five people in a vehicle suspected of transporting an unknown quantity of
methamphetamine for the purpose of distribution; it was the middle of the night;
the back seat passengers had made furtive movements toward the rear of the vehicle
before it belatedly pulled over; and both the driver and defendant appeared to be
under the influence of methamphetamine. Knowing that one occupant was directly
implicated in transporting drugs for distribution and that drug dealers are often
armed, the officer frisked defendant, who had been sitting in the back seat. Under
this totality of circumstances, the officer's action was justified to ensure that
defendant was not carrying a dangerous weapon.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY A RELIABLE
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND CORROBORATED BY
THE OFFICER CREATED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP
THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS RIDING FOR
FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his suppression
motion because he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against unlawful seizures. In his view, "[t]he confidential informant's tip was
insufficient to effectuate a stop of Albert's vehicle."

Appellant Br. at 14.

Specifically, he contends that "the tip from the confidential informant was too vague
to be relied upon by the officers." Id. at 12. He also asserts that "the police stopped
the car before the tip could actually be corroborated." Id. at 15. For his analysis,
defendant relies on Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997).3
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant's
suppression motion:
3

The Utah Supreme Court abrogated Mulcahy in State v. Saddler, 2004 UT
105,104 P.3d 1265, a warrants case. Saddler rejected Mulcahy's rigid three-part test
in favor of the more flexible totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Defendant thus
incorrectly relies on Mulcahy for his analysis of the lawfulness of the stop.

9

There was probable cause based on the information from the informant
to stop the vehicle and to believe that the vehicle was containing drugs.
The informant was fairly knowledgeable in the area and actually
conducted [sic] by virtue of having talked to Ms. Albert, and also the
officer had used the informant before and knew that the informant was
- had provided reliable information in the past.
In this case the officer did substantial corroboration of the information
provided by the informant by lis -by hearing him talking on his phone
to Ms. Albert on the way down getting a - and then eventually Ms.
Albert showed up at the location where the officers expected on a back
road coming back to her home. So the totality of the circumstances
would support probable cause based on what the informant said and
then what - on the independent observations of the officer, probable
cause to pull the vehicle over.
R. 176: 66-67 at addendum A. While the trial court applied a probable cause
standard, higher than the reasonable suspicion standard required to lawfully
effectuate a stop, its reasoning is essentially sound.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures, including investigatory stops of automobiles. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648,653 (1979). The law is well-settled that "[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a
police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when the officer... has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such
as transporting drugs." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,141 (Utah App. 1997). The
inquiry on review must then focus on whether Officer Beebe "had a reasonable

10

articulable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants were involved in illegally
transporting drugs/' Id.
To comply with the reasonable suspicion standard, "the seizure must be
based on specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn
from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had committed
or was about to commit a crime/' State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825,827 (Utah App. 1992)
(citing State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,88 (Utah App. 1987)). There is no bright line test
for determining when reasonable suspicion exists. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213,215
(Utah App. 1991). Rather, courts employ a totality of the circumstances test,
recognizing that police officers, by virtue of their specialized experience, can
sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens would not. Sykes, 840
P.2d at 827; State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,1366 n.2 (Utah App. 1987). "Reasonable
suspicion... is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police
and its degree of reliability. Both factors-quantity and quality-are considered in the
'totality of the circumstances— the whole picture/" Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)).
Here, Officer Beebe began with good quality information—a tip from a
confidential informant with whom he had worked on multiple occasions and who
had established his reliability by consistently providing Beebe with sound
11

information that had led to multiple drug distribution prosecutions- R. 176:34-36.
The content of the information was also good. While the CI originally reported only
that Mary Albert was in Salt Lake to pick up methamphetamine for distribution in
Utah County and that defendant was with her, the CI subsequently contacted her at
least three more times, in each instance adding to the quantity of information on
which the police relied. First, the CI set up a drug buy at Albert's home. Id. at 36,
47. Second, the CI tracked Albert's progress, learning that she had stopped to pick
up an additional passenger. Id. at 37. And third, the CI pinpointed Albert's location
as she drove between R.C. Willey in Orem and her home via back roads. Id.
Officer Beebe was well-positioned to corroborate the reliability of the CI's
information. He was "very familiar" with Mary Albert's vehicle and so had no
trouble identifying it as it approached his surveillance location.

Id. at 38.

Moreover, the vehicle appeared on a route and after a time interval consistent with
the CI's last phone call to Albert and her report that she was traveling on back roads
between R.C. Willey and her home. Id. at 38,90. The officer also observed at least

12

three people in the vehicle.4 Finally, the officer immediately recognized both Albert
and defendant as passengers in the vehicle. Id. at 39.
In addition to the facts, rational inferences may be considered in assessing
reasonable suspicion. Sykes, 840 P.2d at 827. While the CFs tip specifically
identified Albert as the purchaser of the drugs for distribution, it is reasonable to
infer that the people traveling with her in the middle of the night might also well be
involved in a common enterprise centering on drug distribution. See Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999) (car passenger, unlike tavern patron, "will
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same
interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing").
In light of the CFs reliability and Officer Beebe's corroborative personal
observations, the totality of the circumstances establish that the officer had objective
facts to support a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle were
illegally transporting drugs. No more was necessary to justify his investigatory stop
of the vehicle in order to confirm or dispel that suspicion.

In addition to Mary Albert, defendant, and the person they picked up on
the way, Mary Albert's son and defendant's spouse were also in the vehicle, making
a total of five people. R. 176: 80.
13

II.
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING THE
LATENESS OF THE HOUR, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE
VEHICLE, THE CI'S TIP THAT AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF
METHAMPHETAMINE WAS BEING TRANSPORTED FOR
DISTRIBUTION, THE FURTIVE MOVEMENTS OF THE
BACKSEAT PASSENGERS, THE OBSERVED SIGNS OF DRUG
IMPAIRMENT IN BOTH THE DRIVER AND DEFENDANT,
AND THE OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE THAT DRUG DEALERS
ARE OFTEN ARMED
Defendant argues that the frisk of his person violated the Fourth Amendment
because the furtive movements of the backseat passengers were not sufficient to
create reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous.5 See
Appellant Br. at 18-20. The trial court disagreed, ruling that reasonable suspicion
supported the pat-down. R. 176:67-68 at addendum A.
The law is well-settled that where an officer has reason to believe that a
lawfully detained person "maybe armed and presently dangerous/' the officer may
"conduct a carefully limited search of the [person's] outer clothing" to determine
"whethertitleperson is in fact carrying a weapon." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30,24
(1968); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,113,78 P.3d 590. An officer, however,
5

Defend ant also briefly references the officer's observation of the syringe cap
on the floor of the car. See Appellant Br. at 18. He does not, however, develop any
argument about this paraphernalia or explain its significance to the point he is
trying to make.
14

may not perform a protective search based on an "inchoate and imparticularized
suspicion or liunch/" Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 The
officer must have "some minimal level of objective justification." INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 217 (1984). Officers "must be able to point to specific facts which,
considered with rational inferences from those facts," give rise to a reasonable belief
that the person may be presently armed or may gain immediate control of a
weapon. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at \ 14 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21); accord Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S 1032,1049-50 (1983).
In determining whether a particular protective search was justified, the
overarching question for courts is "whether 'the facts available to the officer at the
moment of... the search warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that
the action taken was appropriate/ " Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 (quoting Terry, 392
U.S. at 21-22) (internal quotation omitted). "Courts must... avoid the temptation to
divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Warren, 2003 UT
36, at 1 1 4 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2003)). Instead, they
"must view the articulable facts in their totality." Id.; see also State v. Lafond, 2003 UT
App 101, % 19,68 P.3d 1043 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at
255-56 (3d ed. 1996) (articulating two basic scenarios warranting Terry frisks, the
first of which analyzes all the unique facts and circumstances that give rise to
15

reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed)). And although the Court
applies an objective standard, it must give "due weight... to the specific reasonable
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience/'

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at H 20-21

(recognizing that "an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances/' based on his or
her training and experience, "factor[s] into the objective analysis").
In this case, defendant relies solely on the back seat passengers' furtive
movements towards the rear of the vehicle prior to the stop to argue that Officer
Beebe lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him.

See Appellant Br. at 18-20.

Defendant, however, ignores the totality of the circumstances with which Officer
Beebe was faced. Officer Beebe was acting on a tip from a reliable informant that an
unknown quantity of methamphetamine was being transported from Salt Lake to
Utah County for distribution. R. 176:36; cf. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101 at 119 (noting
that dealing in large quantities of narcotics, by its inherent nature, gives rise to a
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, but that dealing in small quantities
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (citation omitted)). When Officer Beebe
turned on his lights and chirped his siren, the vehicle did not pull over immediately,
as the officer expected. R. 176: 90-91. Moreover, while the vehicle was still
traveling, Officer Beebe observed "people in the rear of the vehicle reaching to the
16

very far back of the Jeep Cherokee/' Id. at 91. Officer Beebe knew from experience
that drug dealers often arm themselves for protection from the police and other
drug dealers.6 Id. at 41. Further, the stop occurred at 3:00 a.m. Id. at 90. And there
were five individuals in the suspect vehicle, but only four officers on or near the
scene. Id. at 80; R. 173:10,11-12; see Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,412

(1997)

("the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible
sources of harm to the officer").
Approaching the driver, Officer Beebe immediately recognized signs of
methamphetamine impairment. R. 176:42. And as soon as the driver exited the car,
the officer saw drug paraphernalia on the floor of the vehicle.7 Id. at 43. Suspecting
drug transportation and observing the results of drug usage, Officer Beebe directed

6

In State v. Baker, this court determined that a frisk was unlawful, where the
officers had already collected 13 dangerous weapons from the driver and
passengers of a stopped vehicle. In addition, an officer specifically testified that he
frisked defendant for an unlawful purpose, "to search for drugs and contraband."
Baker, 2008 UT App 115,118,182 P.3d 935. Here, in contrast, the officer suspected
that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant might well be armed.
Indeed, he testified that he was concerned for his safety because he knew from
experience that "[individuals in the drug culture often arm themselves to protect
themselves from the criminal element and from law enforcement." R. 176:41.
7

Defendant accurately notes the trial court's clearly erroneous finding that
syringes were found in the seat pocket in front of defendant. See Appellant Br. at 17.
Only a syringe cap was found on the driver's side of the car. R. 176:43. The court's
inaccuracy, however, is harmless under the totality of the circumstances analysis.
17

all five occupants "to put their hands where [he] could see them... [to] fr[ee]ze the
environment/7 Id. at 44. Ordering defendant out of the car, Beebe saw that he, too,
was impaired, and frisked him as well. Id. at 44,93.
Where defendant was traveling with Mary Albert late at night, just as
predicted by the CI who reported she was on a drug run, the officer could
reasonably infer that defendant might be part of a common enterprise involving
drug distribution. He could also infer that the backseat passengers' furtive
movements might involve weapons with which to protect the contraband. These
inferences, combined with the recited objective facts, considered as a totality, amply
justified the officer's determination that defendant might well be armed with a
dangerous weapon and should be frisked. No more is necessary to justify his
action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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to present to the Court a warrant to search the automobile

2

and a warrant to be able to search Mr. Jack Wilkinson based upon

3

the fact that he appeared to be consistent —

he appeared to be

4 I under the influence consistent with methamphetamine, there is
5

paraphernalia in the car and the information he had about Jack

6

Wilkinson going to purchase these drugs, your Honor, I think that

7

that would have supported a search warrant, and affi — that

8

would have supported a warrant.

9

Your Honor, the analysis, obviously, the Court knows is

10

not whether reasonable doubt, it's just probable cause that the

11

item is going to be found.

12

people are returning —

13

Salt Lake from purchasing methamphetamine and you have all that

14

additional information, your Honor, certainly there's a probable

15

cause to believe that possibly that methamphetamine might be

16

stashed on the persons in the car, and that there is probable

17

cause to believe that the other persons in the car are aware of

18

the criminal enterprise that's going on.

19

THE COURT:

Certainly when four people —

three

four or three people returning from

Okay.

We'll submit it.

Thank you. All right.

The Court

20

first notes that Mr. Wilkinson does have a reasonable expectation

21

of privacy in his pants and shirt pockets.

22

issue here is was the officer justified in going into his pockets

23

by an exception to the exclusionary rule.

24
25

So that's kind of the

There was probable cause based on the information from
the informant to stop the vehicle and to believe that the vehicle

L
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was containing drugs.

2

in the area and actually conducted by virtue of having talked to

3

Ms. Albert, and also the officer had used the informant before

4

and knew that the informant was — had provided reliable

5

information in the past.

6

The informant was fairly knowledgeable

In this case the officer did substantial corroboration

7

of the information provided by the informant by lis —

8

him talking on his phone to Ms. Albert on the way down getting

9 a

—

by hearing

and then eventually Ms. Albert showed up at the location

10

where the officers expected on a back road coming back to her

11

home.

12

probable cause based on what the informant said and then what —

13

on the independent observations of the officer, probable cause to

14

pull the vehicle over.

15

So the totality of the circumstances would support

Once the officer — to see whether there were drugs in

16 I it. Of course, once there's probable cause regarding the motor
17

vehicle, then the automobile exception, and also plain view

18

doctrine sort of supported the officer conducting the search.

19

this case, seeing the syringe cap and then looking in the pockets

20

finding the syr —

In

on the back of the seat finding the syringes

21 j and so forth, that would have eventually been okay.
22

Now as to taking Mr. Wilkinson out of the vehicle and

23

patting him down, there was a reasonable suspicion, I believe, at

24

a minimum to ask him to come out and get patted down.

25

believe that there was probable cause to believe that he may be

Further, I
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involved in possessing illegal drugs because the officer

2 I observed him to have dilated pupils and he appeared to be
3

under the influence of drugs.

4

Mr. Wilkinson at this point.

5

I'm talking specifically about

So on the pat down the officer felt objects in

6

Mr. Wilkinson's pocket that were —

7

being contraband, some were consistent with being weapons. The

8

bag of bolts, the pocketknife —

9

Mr. Silva.

10

some were consistent with

although that —

I agree with

This seems to be a fairly late development;

nevertheless, the officer recalls there being a pocketknife.

11

So at that point the officer would have number one, had

12

reason to further the search in order to —

13

his safety to make sure that there weren't any weapons, and

14

seeing Mr. Wilkinson reach into his pocket, that would heighten

15

objectively the reason for the officer telling Mr, Wilkinson to

16

stop and the officer would look into his pocket.

17

be one ground on which the exce — there would be an exception to

18

the exclusionary rule, was officer's safety following the Terry

19

search.

20

in the interest of

So that would

The other ground would be that because the syringes

21

were discovered right in front of —

in the seat pocket where

22

Mr. Wilkinson was sitting where his knees would have been,

23

essentially, Mr. Wilkinson —

24

cause to arrest based on the location of those syringes.

25

Therefore, the contraband in the pockets would have been subject

there would have been probable
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to a search (inaudible) lawful arrest, which would be — so

2

there's a contemporaneous issue.

3

contemporaneous with an arrest, and also an inevitable

4

discovery rule.

This would have been

5

So based on that, I think that in this case there was —

6

that the search was supported by an exception to the exclusionary

7

rule, and so the Court will deny the motion to suppress.

8
9
10

Now Counsel, do you want to take a break before you do
your opening statements, or —

minutes, Mr. Silva, before you do your opening statements?

11
12
13

do you need a break for a few

MR. SILVA:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

My client would like a

recess.
Why don't we take about 10 minutes.

14

Just tell the jury we're sorry, but we had some matters we had to

15

take care of, but we'll start up —

16

10 after with opening statements of Counsel.

tell them we'll start up at

17

MR. KENNARD:

18

THE COURT:

19

COURT BAILIFF:

20

THE COURT:

21

(Short recess taken)

22

(Court already in session when recorder was turned on)

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. KENNARD:

25

THE COURT:

Thank you.
Okay.

Thank you.

All rise.

We'll be in recess.

Call the jury back in?
Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

Those present when the Court recessed

